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Volume XIV SPRING-SUMMER 1965 Number 2
MECHANICS' LIEN WAIVERS AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF CONSIDERATION
ROBERT KRATOVIL AND HAR71Y Q. ROHDE*
RULE THAT A MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIM WAIVER MUST BE
SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION.
HE general rule that the digests lay down is that the waiver of
a mechanic's lien claim must be supported by consideration.'
Examination of the decisions reveals that the rule is well sup-
ported by the authorities.2 Surprisingly, however, the decisions seem
to be totally devoid of any reasoning indicating why the presence
of consideration is indispensable to the validity of a mechanic's lien
waiver.3
1 36 AM. JuR. Mechanics' Liens § 200 (1941); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens S 223 (1948).
2 Plunkett v. Winchester, 98 Ark. 160, 135 S.W. 860 (1911); Kelley v. Johnson, 251
111. 135, 95 N.E. 1068 (1911); McCorkle v. Lawson & Co., 259 S.W.2d 27 (Ky. 1953);
Taylor v. Fuller, 162 Ky. 568, 172 S.W. 959 (1915); Colvin Lumber & Coal Co. v.
J. & G. Corp., 260 Minn. 46, 109 N.W.2d 425 (1961); Home Supply Co. v. Ostrom,
164 Minn. 99, 204 N.W. 647 (1925); Abbott v. Ngash, 35 Minn. 452, 29 N.W. 65
(1886); Giammarine v. J. W. Caldewey Constr. Co., 72 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. App. 1934);
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg. Co. 101 N.E:2d 408 (C.P., Hamilton
County, Ohio 1950); Eason Oil Co. v. M. A. Swatek & Co., 169 Okla. 170, 36 P.2d 504
(1934); Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Knudsen Buildeis Supply Co., 385 P.2d 982 (Utah
1963).
3 In Abbott v. Nash, supra note 2, all the court said was: "The writing which is
claimed to waive or release plaintiff's lien right do.s not appear to be supported by
* MR. KRATOVIL, author of the book REAL ESTATE LAW, currently in its third edition,
was formerly an instructor in the DePaul University College of Law, and is presently
an instructor of Real Property Law at the American Savings and Loan Institute, as
well as serving as General Counsel for the Chicago Title Insurance Company.
MR. ROHDE received his B.A. cum laude from Amherst College, 1954, his L.L.B. with
honor from Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1959, and his L.L.M. from John Marshall
Law School, 1962. He is an attorney with the Chicago Title and .Trust Company and
an Instructor at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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The assumption seems warranted that the courts feel that they are
applying some general principle of contract law. Thus, in Kelley v.
Johnson,4 the court said:
Clearly, if a lien can be waived in the original contract, it can be subsequently
waived, for a valuable consideration, as between the original parties. The right
to modify a contract as between the original parties, so long as there are no
intervening rights, involves the exercise of the same power as does execution of
the original contract.
One immediately encounters, in consequence, two questions the
courts have left unanswered, namely: (1) Does the waiver of a
mechanic's lien call into play principles of contract law relating to
consideration, or are we dealing, rather, with the voluntary extinguish-
ment of a property right? (2) Even if considerations of contract law
are relevant, is the waiver of a right, as distinguished from the forma-
tion of a valid contract, such a transaction as requires a consideration
under the modern law of contracts, especially as it has been up-dated
by the Uniform Commercial Code?
Important policy factors require that subcontractors and material-
men be bound by their waivers regardless of the presence or absence
of consideration." When a mortgage banker undertakes to disburse
the proceeds of a construction loan, he must, of course, take steps to
safeguard the priority of his mortgage lien against mechanics' liens
that may arise during the course of construction. If he proceeds with
due care he will disburse the funds in various stages as the building
goes up. On big jobs disbursements are often made monthly during
the year, often longer, so that construction goes forward. As each dis-
bursement is made, the general contractor will demand lien waivers
any consideration, and is therefore ineffectual." The same court twice followed the
general rule without offering any other reason than the precedent of the Abbott
case. See Home Supply Co. v. Ostrom, supra note 2, and Colvin Lumber and Coal Co.
v. J. & G. Corp., supra note 2. Many courts have given no reason at all for following
the general rule except the authority of Cyc., C.J., and C.J.S. In Giammarine v. J. W.
Caldewey Constr. Co., supra note 2, and in Eason Oil Co. v. M. A. Swatek & Co.,
supra note 2, for example, two courts followed the general rule solely on the authority
of 40 C.J. Mechanics' Liens 314 (1926). In Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Birzer Bldg.
Co., supra note 2, an Ohio court refused to follow an Ohio precedent, giving as its only
reason that it preferred the rule set forth in C.J.S.
4 Supra note 2. See also A. J. Yawger & Co. v. Joseph, 184 Ind. 228, 108 N.E. 774
(1915).
5 It has been said that the mechanic's lien laws constitute one of the principal impedi-
ments to individual home ownership in this country. Stalling, The Need for Special,
Simplified Mechanics' Lien Acts Applicable to Home Construction, 5 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoa. 592 (1938).
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from each subcontractor and materialnan he pays. Moreover, in
some states he will demand from each subcontractor (plumber, elec-
trician, and so on) an affidavit as to possible "sub-subcontractors" with
whom the subcontractor has dealt. This last requirement is intended
to elicit the possible presence of unpaid material suppliers, from whom
the mortgage banker must also solicit waivers.6 The resulting bundle
of documents is apt to be formidable. One such file, taken by the
writers at random, contained 166 documents. The burden of pre-
paring this mass of papers is a heavy one. It entails substantial costs
and expenses that are reflected in the contract price quoted for the
job. How does the requirement of consideration for lien waivers affect
this situation?
In the first place, the general contractor, traditionally undercapi-
talized, often lacks the funds to make the periodic payments to sub-
contractors. So as a progress payment is due, the general contractor
goes to the subcontractors and solicits their lien waivers, often giving
them post-dated checks in payment. The lien waivers recite payment
of full consideration. Actually no payrnent has been made. After
he has received disbursement from the mortgage lender, the general
contractor has funds, deposits them in the bank, and the post-dated
checks will clear. If, however, the general contractor diverts the
funds received to another account that is more pressing, the checks
will be dishonored, and the subcontractors who have given lien
waivers reciting receipt of payment will nevertheless file mechanics'
lien claims and seek to foreclose. Coun,:el must be retained to de-
fend these suits. Sometimes the defense succeeds, sometimes it fails.
If it fails, often as not it does so because the court finds that the
waiver was given without actual receipt of consideration and must
therefore be held void. This is an experience altogether too common-
place. Almost every mortgage banker has had such an experience.
7
6 D'Antonio Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Strollo, 172 N.E.2d 484 (Ohio App. 1959).
Most of the litigation involves subcontractors rather than general contractors and a
good deal of it involves material suppliers.
7 That mortgagees suffer losses because of Mechanics's Liens is attested to by the
extensive annotation in 80 A.L.R.2d 179 (1961). Many cases discussed therein reveal
that the mechanic's lien claimant has often contended successfully for priority of lien.
Dishonored checks are commonplace in such situations. E.g., Eason Oil Co v. M. A.
Swatek & Co., 169 Okla. 170, 36 P.2d 504 (1934). IAhere the mortgagee has success-
fully contended for priority, the loss has often fallen on the mortgagor, who through
some technical non-compliance with the rigid requirements of the mechanic's lien
law has been compelled to pay to the subcontractor a bill he has already paid in good
faith to the general contractor.
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Even if he is willing to run the risks involved in making disbursement
to the general contractor in reliance on lien waivers instead of making
disbursement directly to the subcontractors, the mortgage banker
must exercise special care in scrutinizing this mass of documents, for
under the usual rules of inquiry-notice any statement in any docu-
ment indicating that the subcontractors remain unpaid may invalidate
the entire mass of documents.
8
To avoid the risk and trouble this situation tends to create, many
mortgage bankers insist on disbursing directly to the subcontractors.
That way they can be certain that the subcontractors actually re-
ceive payment and that consideration is given for each lien waiver
presented. When one considers the number of subcontractors in-
volved in any substantial construction job, one can readily under-
stand how much clerical help and floor space the mortgage banker
must devote to this pointless ceremony. To what purpose? The sub-
contractor, an adult person of sound mind, has said, "I have waived
my lien." Why should a court say such a waiver is valid only if paid
for? Not one case of all those examined has offered one word of
explanation. All that one finds is banal reiteration of the statement
that consideration is necessary.
THE MECHANIC'S LIEN CLAIM AS A PROPERTY RIGHT-
EXTINGUISHMENT WITHOUT CONSIDERATION
While it has occasionally been said that consensual liens are con-
tract rights,9 this view is manifestly inapplicable to mechanics' liens.
They are purely the creature of statute. 10 True the general contractor
8 Knowledge of a fact gives constructive notice of all material facts which further
inquiry suggested by the fact would have disclosed. One learning of a fact is charge-
able with notice of all that he would have learned if he had pursued his inquiry to the
full extent to which it led. Guerin v. Sunburst Oil & Gas Co., 68 Mont. 365, 218 Pac.
949 (1923). Lien waivers often contain crude and cryptic notations such as "Not to
be used until funds are available for payment." Such statements may well put the
mortgage lender on notice that the lien waivers are in fact not supported by con-
sideration. This may well destroy the defense of estoppel, which has occasionally been
invoked to protect the mortgage lender where consideration has been lacking. 65
A.L.R. 282, 317 (1930). The notion has occasionally been entertained that considera-
tion is present because of the detriment suffered by the landowner or mortgagee in
making payment to the general contractor. McLellan v. Mamernick, 118 N.W.2d 791
(Minn. 1962). This is a plausible theory but ignores the basic proposition that con-
sideration has no place at all in the solution of the problem.
9 Peck v. Jenness, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 611, 619 (1849).
10 36 AM. JUR. Mechanics' Liens § 123 (1941); 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106F
(Casner ed. 1952); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 1 (1948); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1575 (3rd ed. 1939).
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has his in personam contract rights against the landowner, and the
subcontractor has his in personam contract rights against the general
contractor, but the lien itself is a property right in a specific tract of
land.1' The mechanic's lien claimant is uriversally required to file some
notice of his claim'2 which is usually filed in the land records. 3 The
mechanic's lien has all the earmarks of a property right in land.
The mortgage lien provides a useful analogy for scrutiny of the
mechanics' lien. Like a mortgage, a mechanic's lien is a security in-
terest in land and therefore a property right.14 True, the mechanic's
lien owes its existence to a statute while a mortgage lien is created by
the voluntary act of the parties, but, apart from this difference, and
particularly in states that follow the lier theory of mortgages,'5 they
are quite similar in many respects. They are enforced in many states
through identical judicial foreclosure proceedings, and in many states
an identical period of redemption follows the foreclosure sale." Ju-
risdiction over defendants who cannot be served personally is obtained
by publication 17 as in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem. Where a
superior lien is foreclosed, a junior mechanic's lien claimant must be
made a party because he has an interest in the property.' The con-
clusion is inescapable that, like a mortgage lien, the mechanic's lien
is truly a property right.
Since the lien is a property right, it is interesting to speculate as
"Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960); Hogan v. Bleeker, 29 111. 2d 181, 193
N.E.2d 844 (1963).
1236 AM. JUR. Mechanics' Liens 123 (1941); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 131
(1948); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1579 (3rd ed. 1939).
13 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 138 (1948).
14 In Re Pennsylvania Cent. Brewing Co., 135 F.2d 60, 63 (3rd Cir. 1943); In Re
Pennsylvania Brewing Co., 114 F.2d 1010, 1013 (3rd Cir. 1940); Britton v. Western
Iowa Co., 9 F.2d 488, 490 (8th Cir. 1925); In Re Lexington Appliance Co., 185 F. Supp.
235, 238 (D. Md. 1960); Hogan v. Bleeker, 29*111. 2d 181, 193 N.E.2d 844 (1963);
Hollingsworth v. Dow, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 228, 230 (1837); People v. Sheriff, 275
App. Div. 444, 90 N.Y.S. 2d 848, 850 (1949); Young v. J. A. Young Mach. & Supply
Co., 203 Okla. 595, 224 P.2d 971, 973-74 (1950); National Cash Register Co. v. Stock-
Sards Cash Market, 100 Okla. 150, 228 Pac. 778, 780 (1924); Creosoted Wood Block
aving Co. v. McKay, 211 S.W. 822, 823 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); 73 C.J.S. Property
§ 1, at 139-40 (1951).
15 See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, 31 (1951).
1057 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 263 (1948); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1579 (3rd
ed. 1939).
17 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 287 (1948).
1836 AM. JUR. Mechanics' Liens § 250 (1941); 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 284
(1948).
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to the propriety of applying the doctrine of consideration in con-
sidering the validity of waivers of mechanics' liens. If the mechanic's
lien is a property right, only a brief glance at history is needed to
assure us that its kindred in the family of real property rights, with
their ancient feudal antecedents rooted in England's agricultural
past, were created and extinguished for hundreds of years before
the comparatively modern doctrine of consideration gained accept-
ance in the comparatively modern law of contracts. Contract law
developed as England grew into a trading and manufacturing country
and then had need for a law of contracts. Obviously property rights
had been created and extinguished by deeds, grants, mortgages,
leases and releases for hundreds of years without benefit of recourse
to notions of consideration and the same is true today.1"
Turning again to the analogous mortgage lien, we find that it is
sometimes said that a mortgage requires consideration. 20 This, of
course, is nonsense, for mortgages were well understood long before
anyone heard of consideration. 21 A mortgage cannot exist without
a debt. But to say that a mortgage cannot exist without a debt is far
from saying that consideration is required for the creation of a valid
mortgage. If A borrows $10,000 from B on an unsecured note in
1962, A can give a mortgage to B in 1963 as security for the note
without a shred of consideration entering into the mortgage trans-
action.22 In short, a mortgage need not be supported by consideration
and the well-considered authorities so state.22
Since these formidable documents, deeds and mortgages, need not
be supported by consideration, the rights they create can also be ex-
19 A deed conveying fee simple title may be given without consideration. 16 AM.
JUR. Deeds § 57 (1938); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.43 (Casner ed. 1952); 26
C.J.S. Deeds § 16 (1956); 2 PATRON, TITLES § 340 (2d ed. 1957); 6 POWELL, REAL PROP-
ERTY§ 893 (1958); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 984 (3rd ed. 1939). Easement grants do
not require consideration. 28 C.J.S. Easements § 24. A life estate may be given away.
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 59 (3rd ed. 1939). No consideration is required for the
creation of future interests in land. 4 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1866 (2d ed.
1956). In fact, in the majority of instances, future interests are created by donative
conveyances. 3 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 241, comment d (1940).
20 See 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1401 (3rd ed. 1939) for some cases so holding.
21 Ibid.
22 36 AM. JUR. Mortgages § 106 (1941); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 91 (1949); 3 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY S 444 (1952); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1401 (3rd ed. 1939).
23 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY S 16.67 (Casner ed. 1952); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 87
(1949); 1 GLENN, MORTGAGES § 5.6 (1943); OSBORNE, MORTGAGES S 107 (1951); 5 TIF-
FANY, REAL PROPERTY S 1401 (3rd ed. 1939).
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tinguished without the benefit of consideration. If A makes a gift
of land to B, it is certainly an elemeni:ary proposition that B can
make a deed of gift of the same land to A. And if A has given B a
mortgage to secure A's antecedent debt, B can make a gift of the
mortgage and note to A, and the mortgage will be destroyed by
merger.24 Gifts of choses in action are universally recognized.25 And
it is perfectly obvious that, under the doctrine of executed gifts, a
gift of a mortgage by the mortgagee to the mortgagor is of unques-
tioned validity.
2 0
In the termination of property rights, it has never been thought
that consideration is necessary. The authorities tell us that a contingent
remainder may be released to the owner of the estate in possession or
remainder,27 a condition in a deed may be released,28 a life estate
may be released to the remainderman or reversioner,29 and an easement
may be extinguished by a release thereof.30 Never has it been sug-
gested that any of these transactions require consideration. One
seeks in vain for authority that a vested remainder, contingent re-
mainder, life estate, right of entry, possibility of reverter, or lease-
hold estate can be created or extinguished only if consideration is
present. In short, the doctrine of consideration rarely intrudes into
the solution of questions of property law, and historically, this is en-
tirely as it should be.
We must now ask ourselves why, in legal theory, a consideration
must exist for the valid extinguishment of a property right such as
a mechanic's lien. To ask the question is to answer it. If the fee title
to the land can pass or a mortgage lien be created or extinguished
24 
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 759 (1951).
25 Delivery by the creditor to the debtor of an executed satisfaction of an indebted-
ness constitutes a good gift of the chose in action. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 206
(2d ed. 1955). A good illustration is the rule that no consideration is necessary to sup-
port an agreement reducing rent where the reduced rent has been accepted and rent
receipts have been given. 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant §§ 153, 439 (1941); 52
C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 503 (1947); IA CoRBFr, CONTRAcTs (1963) § 184.
26 37 AM. JUR. Mortgages § 1216 (1941); 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1454 (3rd
ed. 1939).
272 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 341 (3rd ed. 1939).
2826 C.J.S. Deeds § 158 (1956); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 204 (3rd ed. 1939).
29 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2.17 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY § 59 (3rd ed. 1939).
3o 17 AM. JUR. Easements § 160 (1938); 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.95 (Cas-
ner ed. 1952); 28 C.J.S. Easements § 61 (1941); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 824 (3rd
ed. 1939).
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without consideration, then a mechanic's lien, which is certainly of
no greater dignity, ought to be subject to the same rules. Since a
mechanic's lien is a security interest, a property right in land, it is
governed by rules of property law, not contract law, and no logical
reason exists why the doctrine of consideration should be invoked.
All this is not to suggest the impropriety of superimposing con-
tract theory upon property law. To the contrary, when this is done
upon reflection and with the deliberate purpose of freeing property
law from ancient fetters and introducing some practical contract con-
siderations, this is a highly desirable evolutionary process that is taking
place today. For example, where a tenant under a lease abandons
the premises, the ancient property learning teaches us that since he
is vested with his estate for years until its termination, the landlord
may continue to collect rent for the balance of the term. 1 The better
modern cases borrow from contract theory and teach us that the
landlord has a duty to mitigate damages." But this is far from saying
that all contract law is applicable to all property law. Obviously an
eclectic approach is indicated, so that those contract doctrines that
promote justice can be incorporated into the body of property law
and those that do not are not so incorporated. We thus have a work-
able formula for determining whether the doctrine of consideration
should be applied to a voluntary waiver or release of property rights.
Is justice promoted when this is done?
Whatever validity remains in the requirement of consideration
where one is considering the formation of a legally enforceable con-
tract, it is certainly relevant to inquire by what right this notion
intrudes into questions of the validity of the release of a statutory
lien, particularly the lien of a subcontractor who has no contractual
relation whatever with the landowner. Conceptually the requirement
is completely indefensible. One is therefore driven to probe into the
unspoken policy factors that lie beneath the assertion that mechanics'
lien waivers must be supported by consideration. It seems almost cer-
tain that the unspoken theory holds to the view that the mortgage
lender is better able to bear the loss, and, indeed, can recoup his
31 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 517 (1941); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 3.99 (Casner ed. 1952); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 497 (1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 902 (3rd ed. 1939).
3.2 32 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 519 (1941); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY
§3.99 (Casner ed. 1952); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 498 (1947); 3 TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY § 902 (3rd ed. 1939).
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loss by charging more interest on future loans, while the plumber,
electrician, or mason is not so fortunately situated. The fallacy of
this line of reasoning is obvious. The mortgage interest rate is made
in the market place, and the misfortunes of particular mortgage
lenders have no impact upon it. Moreover, the ends of justice are
not served by reaching into the pockets of the mortgage lender.
One who furnishes lienable work or material but is not paid has a
clear and simple statutory remedy, namely, to file his mechanic's
lien claim immediately. When instead of doing so, he chooses to
give the general contractor a lien waiver, his motives require inspec-
tion. Many general contractors work with the same crew of subcon-
tractors on job after job. When the gereral contractor solicits a lien
waiver from an unpaid subcontractor so that he can draw down the
mortgage money, the subcontractor makes a clear and deliberate
decision when he complies with the request. He has decided to trust
the general contractor, knowing that if he does not do so, some
other subcontractor may replace him on the next job. When the
general contractor, under pressure from earlier and more impatient
creditors, diverts the loan proceeds to other channels, the trusting
subcontractor is disappointed and files his notice of lien. What claim
does he have upon the chancellor's conscience? An adult person of
sound mind has made a deliberate decision with full awareness of
its implications.33 To rescue him from 1:he consequences of his bad
judgment at the expense of a mortgage lender who has no part in
his folly seems to the authors a far cry from justice.
THE REQUIREMENT OF CONSIDERATION VIEWED IN THE CONTEXT
OF CONTRACT LAW
Even were it to be conceded (improperly, as the authors feel)
that mechanics' liens can find some appropriate niche in the area
of contract law, a brief glance at the doctrine of consideration in
the perspective of history certainly seens in order. One must also
inquire into the credentials and current status of the doctrine, into
33 Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Art Center Apartments, 253 Mich, 501, 235 N.W.
234 (1931). In some parts of the country, for example, in Virginia, where the mechanic's
lien law is unfavorable to mortgage lenders, it is customary for the general con-
tractor to procure a waiver of mechanic's lien signed by all the subcontractors before
any construction has begun. Nothing could more eloquently attest the confidence
these subcontractors repose in the general contractor. These subcontractors would
certainly be surprised to learn that many courts view this act of faith as an empty
gesture.
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its applicability to waiver, and into the impact of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code upon the problem.
The doctrine of consideration had its origin long after England
had emerged from feudalism. The word "consideration," when used
in connection with the law of contract, had not acquired a technical
meaning in the earlier half of the sixteenth century. 4 It was not
until the latter half of that century that pleaders began using the
word "consideration" to introduce the facts upon which they relied
to make promises enforceable by assumpsit. 5 The very existence
of the requirement of consideration in contract formation was in
doubt until relatively modern times. As recently as 1765, Lord
Mansfield, in Pillans v. Van Miero p,3  propounded the view that
consideration was only of evidentiary value and that therefore, if
an agreement were in writing, whether under seal or not, considera-
tion was unnecessary. A few years later, in 1778, Pillans v. Van
Mierop was overruled in Rann v. Hughes.3 7 Although the existence,
in contract formation, of the requirement of consideration could not
be questioned after Rann v. Hughes, the nature of this doctrine was
not finally settled until the mid-nineteenth century. Lord Mansfield
identified the doctrine of consideration with moral obligation." The
view that a merely moral obligation was a sufficient consideration
grew and flourished.39 It was an accepted view until authoritatively
rejected in Eastwood v. Kenyon" in 1840. And since the first me-
chanic's lien law was enacted in 1791, 41 it is evident that the earliest
34 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 5 (1926).
35 Id. at 6.
36 3 Burr. 1663, 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (K.B. 1765).
37 7 Term Rep. 350n4 Poro. Parl. Case 27, 191 Eng. Rep. 1014 (H.L. 1778). See
Lorenzen Causa and Consideration In The Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621, 636-
37 (1919). It is not without significance that Rann v. Hughes caused not a ripple in
mortgage circles. The firming up of the notion of consideration in contract law must
have completely escaped the notice of the mortgage bankers, probably because they
did not dream it had any application to their business.
38 Hawkes v. Saunders, I Cowp. 289, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782). Although Lord
Kenyon overruled the actual decision in Hawkes v. Saunders in Deeks v. Strutt, 5
Term Rep. 690, 101 Eng. Rep. 384 (K.B. 1794), he did not deny the sufficiency of a
moral obligation to support a promise.
39 8 HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra. note 1, at 30.
40 11 A. & E. 438, 52 Rvsd. Rep. 400 (1840).
414 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.106F (Casner ed. 1952).
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mechanics' lien waivers were executed before the doctrine of con-
sideration had become crystallized.
There is good reason to believe that changes in the doctrine of
consideration will continue to evolve. This doctrine was built up
in the process of determining what promises should be enforced,
and it is still building.42 Such developments as the statutory abolition
of the seal in many jurisdictions may well cause courts to revise
their views as to what promises should be enforced. At common law,
a contract right could be created or released by an instrument under
seal without any consideration. 43 Now, many states have altered the
common law of sealed instruments by' legislation." Such changes
have created a gap in the law of contracts which previously provided
a means by which, without consideration, an intentionally voluntary
promise could be made binding or by which a contract right could
be voluntarily extinguished. 45 Efforts to fill the gap have proven large-
ly unsuccessful. 46 It is significant, however, that in some states in
which the seal has been abolished, by statute, supplementary legislation
has already been enacted providing that a written release shall be effec-
tive without consideration and that a promise in writing shall be
enforceable in the absence of affirmative proof that there was no
consideration for it.47 In view of both the gap created by the statutory
abolition of the seal and of the legislation already enacted in an at-
tempt to fill that gap, it would seem reasonable to expect more such
supplementary legislation in the future. lit is also reasonable to expect
that as the need becomes more apparen: courts will also attempt to
fill the gap.
Although the notion that the presence of consideration is neces-
sary to the validity of a contract has been vigorously attacked, es-
42 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS S 122, at 377-78 (1963).
43 10. Id. § 252; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 219 (3rd ed. 1957).
44 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 254; 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 219A.
Learned Hand viewed this development as unfortunate. James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
45 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 11, § 219.
46 Id. § 219.
47 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 254. For examples of such legislation, see CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1541, and comment thereon in 12 HA3TINGS L.J. 377 (1961); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 26.978(1); N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 279(1). Also see the MODEL WRITTEN
OBLIGATIONS ACT as adopted in Pennsylvania.
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pecially in modern times, 48 this is not the place to embark upon any
prolonged discussion of this controversy. One may concede that
some case can be made for such a requirement where the court is
to be called upon and set in motion for the enforcement of the
rights created by contract. However, where a party to a valid con-
tract, by his deliberate and voluntary act relinquishes a right or rights
created by the contract, there is much less reason for insisting upon
the presence of consideration.49 It is difficult to comprehend why
a party who is sui juris cannot voluntarily surrender a contract right
without being paid, when he is at complete liberty under the law
of gifts to give away uncounted millions in value of property with-
out being paid one cent.
Principles of contract law do not require that all waivers be sup-
ported by consideration. 0 Consensual rights can sometimes be waived
without consideration. For example, the right to declare a forfeiture
of an installment contract for the sale of land is purely a right created
by the contract, as distinguished from the right of rescission, which
does not depend upon any provision in the contract.51 If the purchaser
defaults in payment, thereby giving the vendor the right to exercise
his right of forfeiture, but thereafter offers payment which the ven-
dor accepts, the contract right of forfeiture is thereby waived.
5 2
48 Contracts were enforced at common law long before the doctrine of considera-
tion was invented. 1 CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 10, § 252. Modern students of the doc-
trine of consideration have suggested that contracts should now be enforced even
though they are not supported by consideration. Thus Markby states that it is impossible
to apply the doctrine of consideration as a test of legal liability with consistency and
justice. MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW 315 (6th ed. 1905). Salmond suggests that no ill
results would occur if the doctrine of consideration were abolished. SALMOND, JURIS-
PRUDENcE 374 (Manning 8th ed. 1930). Holdsworth concurs in Lord Mansfield's view
that consideration should be treated simply as a piece of evidence. 8 HOLDSWORTH,
op. cit. supra note 34, at 47. Lorenzen contends that the doctrine of consideration
can only be explained historically and that there is no rational reason for it. Loren~en,
Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 YALE L.J. 621 (1919). Llewellyn
characterizes consideration as a "vast, sprawling field with parts of its roots hope-
lessly intertangled with other roots from other phases of our law." Llewellyn, Com-
mon Law Reform of Consideration: Are There Measures? 41 COLUM. L. REV. 863
(1941).
49 Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 820 (1941).
50 According to Corbin, "In particular, if the question is asked whether a 'waiver'
can be legally effective if it is not accompanied by a 'consideration' it cannot be
answered without knowing what it is that is being 'waived' and what is the mode
in which the 'waiver' is being attempted." CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 42, § 752.
51Realty Securities Corp. v. Johnson, 93 Fla. 46, 111 So. 532 (1927),
52 Annot., 107 A.L.R. 345 (1937).
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This doctrine is universally accepted. Every court in this country
has held, in this context, that a contract right can be waived without
payment of a penny of consideration. If consensual rights can be
waived without consideration, then contract theory ought not pre-
clude the waiver of a statutory right, such as a mechanic's lien claim,
without consideration.
Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code illustrates that the
requirement of consideration for a waiver is dying. Thus, section
1-107 "makes consideration unnecessary to the effective renunciation
or waiver of rights or claims arising out of an alleged breach of a
commercial contract where such renunciation is in writing and signed
and delivered by the aggrieved party." 53 Thus a court which follows
the view that a mechanic's lien partakes somewhat of a contract right
could reach the conclusion that a waiver thereof does not require
consideration, basing its conclusion on the policy expressed in the
Uniform Commercial Code. The reference to breach in the Code is
inapplicable to lien waivers because the subcontractor's waiver runs
in favor of a party (mortgagee or landowner) with whom he has
no contract and because lien waivers do not relate to breach of
contract.
Courts following the sounder view z:hat a mechanic's lien claim
is a property right rather than a contract right can also use the policy
expressed in the Uniform Commercial Code as an additional reason
for correctly concluding that a waiver of lien does not require con-
sideration. While the express provisions (if the Code have only limited
application to real property there are strong indications that the
thinking found in the Code will spread far beyond its strict confines.
As early as 1951, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the
case of Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Consolidated Fisheries Co.54 drew
upon a rule of law stated in the Code and said in a footnote, "we
think provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code which do not
conflict with statute or settled case law are entitled to as much respect
and weight as courts have been inclined to give to the various Re-
53 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-107 (Official Draft 1962). The Code makes other
important modifications in the doctrine of consideration. Thus, section 2-205 "is
intended to modify the former rule which required that 'firm offers' be sustained
by consideration in order to bind, and to require instead that they must merely be
characterized as such and expressed in signed writings." Id. § 2-205, comment 1. See
also, id. § 2-209.
54 190 F.2d 817, 822 (3rd Cir. 1951).
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statements. It, like the Restatements, has the stamp of approval of
a large body of American scholarship." This point of view was ap-
proved in Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy 5  decided before the Code be-
came effective in Massachusetts when the court cited and relied on
section 2-403 of the Code and said: "Under which, if it were applica-
ble, the result which we reach would seem to be required. In Uni-
versal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank and Trust Co.56 decided
by Judge Wyzanski in the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts on May 2, 1958, before the Code became effec-
tive, the court cited section 4-403 of the Code in support of the cus-
tomer's right to stop payment under the present Massachusetts law
and said: "And reference to this Code is appropriate because the
Massachusetts court regards it less as novel enactment than as largely
a restatement and clarification of existing law which has the approval
of American scholars ......
In other words, if we accept the Code as a comprehensive, modern
view of what is customary, just, and practical in business transactions,
it would be unfair to deny dealers in real estate the benefits of this
view. Moreover, in cases arising prior to the effective date of the Code
the courts may well choose to apply the wisdom the Code affords.
CONCLUSION
From both the standpoint of policy and concept, it is plain that the
requirement of consideration is inapplicable to mechanics' lien waiv-
ers. From the standpoint of policy, it is clear that construction lending
would be facilitated by abolition of the rule that a mechanic's lien
waiver must be supported by consideration. It is also apparent that
the cause of justice would be promoted by the abolition of this rule
because the benefit that would accrue to the property owner and con-
struction lender would not be accompanied by any real detriment or
hardship to subcontractors, who are, after all, in the best possible posi-
tion to determine which general contractors can be trusted. Indeed,
material suppliers are considered the best source of credit information
55 336 Mass. 322, 145 N.E.2d 710 (1957).
56 161 F. Supp. 790 (D.C. Mass. 1958). The court cited Budget Plan, Inc. v. Savoy,
supra note 29, and Malcolm, The Uniform Commercial Code: Review, Assessment,
Prospect, 15 Bus. LAW. 348, 360 (1959).
57 See, for example, Schroeder v. Benz, 9 Il1. 2d 589, 138 N.E.2d 496 (1956), where
the court applied the policy of a statute that was enacted after the occurrence of the
transaction in question.
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on general contractors. From the standpoint of concept, the better
view is that a mechanic's lien claim is a property right, and since
property rights can be extinguished without consideration, it is plain
that the requirement of consideration i; inapplicable to mechanic's
lien waivers. Even if a mechanic's lien claim is to be regarded as a con-
tract right, there is no conceptual barrier to the abolition of the rule
that a mechanic's lien waiver must be supported by consideration.
Principles of contract law do not require that all waivers be supported
by consideration. Finally, a court confronted with a precedent based
on the rule that a mechanic's lien waiver must be supported by con-
sideration could use the policy of the Uniform Commercial Code to
rid the books of this precedent. It could do so whether it regarded a
mechanic's lien claim as a property right or as a contract right. It
would be justified in doing so not only because of the respect which
the policy of the Code commands, but also because the ever increasing
volume of construction lending necessitates a modern rule that serves
the ends of justice and that is sound from the standpoint of policy
and concept.
